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A phrase used for internal criticism within leftist movements in the 70s 
and 80s, “politically correct,” has now become equivalent to thought 
policing in the minds of many professional academicians. Taking 
University of Toronto as an example, this essay questions whether the 
thought policing (as enforcement of political correctness) accusation 
is justifi ed, and if so, in what forms such enforcement could take 
place, and whether any of those are defensible. Three possible forms of 
enforcement are identifi ed as curricular occupation, language control, 
and confl ict of rights; among these, the last is the most severe. In 
terms of rights, the issue of political correctness is usually framed as a 
confl ict between expression rights and equality rights. In a university, 
restriction of expression rights is not justifi ed. However, expression 
rights need not be characterized as confl icting with equality rights if 
both those charged with policing and those who charge them genuinely 
respect each others’ expression rights.
RÉSUMÉ
L’expression  « politiquement correct » utilisée par les mouvements 
de gauche des années 70 et 80 dans un contexte de critique interne 
est maintenant devenue l’équivalent de coercition idéologique dans 
l’esprit de plusieurs universitaires.  Prenant l’Université de Toronto en 
exemple, cet essai cherche à déterminer si cette accusation a sa raison 
d’être, et le cas échéant, sous quelles formes ces mesures coercitives se 
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manifestent et si l’une ou l’autre est défendable.  Trois de ces mesures 
peuvent exister et se défi nissent comme suit : occupation  pédagogique, 
contrôle linguistique et confl its au niveau des droits, qui est la plus 
grave de toutes.  Pour ce qui est des droits, la question du conformisme 
politique est habituellement abordée en tant qu’incompatibilité entre 
droits d’expression et droits à l’égalité.  Dans une université, imposer 
des restrictions au niveau de la libre expression est injustifi é.  Par 
contre, il n’est pas nécessaire de caractériser la libre expression comme 
étant incompatible avec les droits à l’égalité si ceux qui sont chargés 
d’exercer la censure et ceux qui la dénoncent respectent tous les deux 
leurs droits concernant la liberté d’expression.
INTRODUCTION
A phrase used for internal criticism within leftist movements in the 70s and 
80s, “politically correct” (Smith, 1995, p. 31, 56-60) today conjures images of 
thought policing in the minds of many professional academicians. They feel that 
those who are politically correct are trying to restrict the rights of those who 
are politically “incorrect” to speak their minds – in other words, their freedom 
of expression. In a university, not many accusations could be worse than the 
accusation that free speech is threatened.1 Here are two passages, the fi rst from 
University of Toronto’s Statement of freedom of speech (1992), and the second 
from its Statement of institutional purpose (1992).
[T]he essential purpose of the University is to engage in the pursuit of 
truth, the advancement of learning and the dissemination of knowledge. 
To achieve this purpose, the members of the University must have as a 
prerequisite freedom of speech and expression, which means the right 
to examine, question, investigate, speculate and comment on any issue 
without reference to prescribed doctrine, as well as the right to criticize 
the University and society at large. 
It is this human right to radical, critical teaching and research with 
which the University has a duty above all to be concerned; for there 
is no one else, no other institution and no other offi ce, in our modern 
liberal democracy, which is the custodian of this most precious and 
vulnerable right of the liberated spirit. 
The following is also from Statement of freedom of speech (italics added): “The 
University must allow the fullest range of debate. It should not limit that debate 
by preordaining conclusions, or punishing or inhibiting reasonable exercise of 
speech.”  
So, even if the accusation is true, those who are “politically correct” cannot 
be acting on behalf of the university. This short essay is aimed at bringing some 
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clarifi cation to this perplexing issue by trying to understand what and whose 
rights are at stake in the “thought police” accusation within Canadian universities, 
whether these rights are jeopardized, and if so, whether the attempt to restrict 
them by the so-called thought police is justifi ed. In my attempt to cover as much 
ground as possible, I will have to rely on some generalizations and omissions. I 
will, for example, characterize the aggrieved party as homogeneous – based on 
the most salient features of their complaint. Further, to avoid losing sight of the 
central issue under the weight of details, I do not examine any particular case 
of complaint but rather try to draw a rough sketch of the most relevant issues. 
I have chosen the University of Toronto and its policies as a paradigm due to 
its multicultural character (the reason for that should become clear soon); thus 
my references to “the university” are to the University of Toronto. Last, I ignore 
parallel goings-on in other parts of society, such as in journalism, and only 
address the complaint of academics against academics (not students or other 
university members), and only insofar as the complaint is informal – despite my 
occasional use of legal-sounding terms like “complainant.” 
The Complainant and the Complaint
The individuals who feel their rights are restricted are university instructors 
who mostly identify themselves in the political correctness issue as being at 
odds with left-wing, or feminist, or post-modern, or de-constructivist/post-
structuralist views, or diversity and multiculturalism in university curricula, or 
all of the above. (At times the list also includes liberalism.2) Their primary claim 
is that they are, in their capacity as scholars, prevented by subtle or not-so-subtle 
means from expressing their negative views on the above and related political 
positions, and that they are pressured to use “correct” language, including, but 
not limited to, non-racist, non-sexist, non-heterosexist expressions (e.g., see 
Smith, 1995, p. 47).3 
The right they experience as jeopardized is freedom of expression, a liberty 
right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 2: 
“Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: … (b) freedom of … opinion 
and expression.” One has, against everyone, this right to freely express oneself 
or to decline to do so, and to non-interference.4 As indicated earlier, from the 
point of view of the university, this right is the right with utmost strength: 
“Within the unique university context, the most crucial of all human rights are 
the rights of freedom of speech, academic freedom, and freedom of research” 
(Statement of institutional purpose, 1992, p. 3). It follows, as also mentioned, 
that the university has no offi cial thought-policing function or penalties against 
voicing disturbing opinions: “These rights are meaningless unless they entail 
the right to raise deeply disturbing questions and provocative challenges to the 
cherished beliefs of society at large and the university itself” (p. 3, italics added). 
Whence comes the aforementioned suppression of voices, then?
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 “Tyranny of the Majority”
J. S. Mill (1956) was well aware of the kind of pressure that can silence an 
unorthodox view, with or without formal backing; he named it the “tyranny of 
the majority” (p. 17). Remarkably, the source of (sometimes unintended) pressure 
need not come from “majority” as understood quantitatively. To use Mill’s 
expression, those who are “most active” (p. 6) – presumably, the most vocal or 
politically involved – are also effectively a “majority.” It is an often unfortunate 
psychological fact about humans that they generally resist change; thus it seems 
inevitable that the majority opinion in any group or society, formal or informal, 
will discourage dissenters from expressing themselves. Academicians, I think, 
must and can self-consciously resist such “inevitability.” But before I fi nd my 
way back to that naïve-sounding optimistic declaration, I will take a closer look 
at the shape of the thought-police “tyranny.” 
“The attempt to limit debate and confi ne teaching, research and publication 
to nonthreatening topics has a history longer than academic freedom itself,” 
writes historian Horn (1999, p. 328). “In this sense, PC [political correctness] has 
always been with U.S.”  But up to recently, the struggle was within a largely 
homogenous group. As Horn (2000) explains, in Canadian universities, “[a]s 
recently as 1960, women, all of them white and Gentile, made up only one 
in seven full-time faculty, while ethnic minorities were still little in evidence” 
(p. 48). “Having cause to feel exposed and vulnerable, members of minority 
groups almost invariably tried to fi t in and stay out of the limelight” (p. 13-14).
Historically, with the exception of a few incidents, academics in Canada 
have been “uncontroversial” (Horn, 1999, p. 13) on the subject of free speech and 
other academic freedoms. Some memorable episodes of controversy include a 
student unrest in 1864 following the increase in the trustee and principal’s power 
to suspend or dismiss faculty members for remarks “‘injurious’ to other professors 
or ‘disrespectful’ to the college authorities” (p. 16); the successful challenge by 
Frank Underhill of an attempted dismissal in 1940-41 following the controversy 
surrounding his remarks that sounded to some people a little short of full loyalty 
to Britain (p. 154-64); and dismissal and reinstatement of Harry Crowe in 1958 
due to a private letter of his, critical of colleagues, ending up on the principal’s 
desk (p. 223-41). But in the short time since the members of the minority groups 
have started to assert themselves, two signifi cant challenges to the ability of 
universities to sustain free speech have taken place in very close succession. 
Before the echoes of the historically disadvantaged groups’ legitimate claims 
to being silenced by the privileged group had died, the same group charged of 
trying to silence them was already complaining of being silenced themselves.
 This oppression is said to take mainly two forms: 1) Implicit or explicit 
disapproval, via some kind of informal speech (or behaviour) code, or 
stigmatization of remarks or scholarly hypotheses that could be conceived as 
an attack on the dignity and status in society of an “identifi able group” and 
its members.5 The disapproved behaviours range from use of discriminatory 
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references towards those groups, for example refusal to display gay-friendly 
stickers on an offi ce door, to research projects which may happen to put a 
certain identifi able group in an unfavourable light. 2) Control over curricula, 
research and conference content by domination with multicultural content, 
interdisciplinary or post-modernist approaches, and “critical theory” themes.6  
The “Thought-police”
The tyrannical majority is identifi ed by the aggrieved as leftists, 
feminists, post-modernists, de-constructionists and supporters of diversity and 
multiculturalism. Following those clues, hereafter I will refer to the aggrieved 
as “traditionalists,” and their putative aggravators as “reformists.” These titles 
are for convenience only, and not meant to be defi nitive. 
The traditionalists notice a connection between the “safe-speak” (Emberley, 
1996, p. 234) in which they are expected to participate and the commitment 
on the part of their “intimidators” to equal opportunity, equity, and anti-
discrimination policies of universities (p. 229). I will not venture into the very 
complex fi rst two concerns. I think they need separate treatment.7 As for the 
third, the university, with its Prohibited discrimination and discriminatory 
harassment policy, affi rms the Canadian Charter claim-right of “equal 
protection and benefi t of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability” (Equality rights, Section 15 [1]), and 
the Ontario Human rights code (Part I: Freedom from discrimination), which 
expands the list to 16 with other factors such as sexual orientation, marital 
status, same-sex partnership status. The university is well-aware of the tension 
between this claim-right to equal protection and consideration, and liberty-right 
of free speech.8 This diffi cult “balancing act” 9 has been also articulated in depth 
by both the majority and minority positions in the Supreme Court of Canada 
case challenging the criminalization of hate speech (R v. Keegstra, 1990), that 
is, limitation of freedom of expression when hatred of “any identifi able group” 
is “willfully” promoted in public communication (Criminal Code of Canada 
319[2]). Granted, the “censored” expressions in universities are not expressions 
of hate (or so I will assume – the “thought police” have legal channels for 
dealing with that). But there are parallels in universities to the “two kinds of 
harm” (of hate speech) mentioned by Justice Dickson – i) to the “target group,” 
and ii) to society at large (R v. Keegstra, para. 746-747): in and outside a 
university, publicly expressed biased language can cause undeserved feelings 
of humiliation and self-doubt in a member of the group in question, and can 
deepen existing prejudicial negative opinions of others toward him or her.10 
Understandably, the reformists object to use of discriminatory expressions.  
One complainant writes that while he has sympathy for the anti-racism 
education aimed at reducing explicit discrimination that grew (“even in university 
communities”) parallel to the increase in Canada of people from other cultures, 
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he is impatient with the extent to which these activities have proceeded (Emberley, 
1996, p. 229). Emberley, a professor of political science, claims that the “noble 
intentions” (p. 229) “now apply, thanks to the cultural left, to such an immense range 
of behaviour,  that universities are utterly polarized and paralyzed” (p. 244); 
worse, counter to original intentions, these institutions are in the midst of 
“further discord and fragmentation” (p. 229). Emberley also views the attitude of 
the politically correct as paternalistic and imperialistic, making a “social 
welfare agency” (p. 230) of the university, taking “intellectual charity” (p. 233) 
to extremes.
Still, to sum up the motivations of the reformists as protection of minorities’ 
rights would be unfair. There are many kinds of reformists – and they are not 
always in harmony with each other.11 For our present purposes, however, it will 
suffi ce if I point out two general groups which, while overlapping, are on the 
whole different in virtue of their aims. 
(1) “Minorities” (identifi able groups) and/or those who speak for or 
about them.12 These reformists are indeed interested in protecting minorities’ 
right to equal treatment. But they may also or instead want to promote the 
rights of minorities to free expression – as articulated in the words of Drakich, 
Taylor, and Bankier (1995), for specialists respectively in sociology, law, and 
social science
[t]he current emphasis is on ensuring that the differing values, 
perspectives, and insights of women and other marginalized groups 
are fully represented in the academy.  . . . These changes confront the 
androcentric and ethnocentric conceptualizations of the university and 
push the boundaries of traditional academic convention to encompass 
diversity of thought and diversity of community. (p. 118).
 (2) De-constructionists, representatives of an intellectual movement that 
reformists in group (1) may or may not endorse. De-constructionists’ motive 
transcends the mere securing of diverse voices. They are, on the whole, not merely 
set upon fi nding an intellectual niche for themselves in the spread of opinions, 
but aim at a revolution of sorts, of overturning established views, including 
standard liberal views, and replacing them with, in Weedon’s (1987) words, “a 
subjectivity which is precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being 
reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak” (p. 32).13  It is not false 
to say that their mission involves an eventual silencing of traditionalist views 
– not by violence or intimidation or sophistry, but by revealing the claims as 
doubtful or unsound.14 The sentiment is not one-sided. The traditionalists may 
prefer to see themselves as victims (see McCaskell, 1995, p. 253), but they too 
have been accused of trying to “delegitimize the claims made upon universities 
…by subordinated social groups” through using a blanket label that is, in the 
words of Richer and Weir (1995), “an ideological code” (p. 11-12): PC (politically 
correct).
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In (2) we fi nd a picture of confl ict for intellectual hegemony that only 
an arena that thrives on free expression could make possible, and therefore 
diffi cult to characterize in terms of infringement on free expression. To be sure, 
if one side makes an overwhelmingly strong case for itself, the other side will 
be “silenced” in virtue of losing its serious listeners. Nonetheless the “losing” 
side is free, as long as the right to expression prevails, to re-group and try to 
win supporters again. Thus, only insofar as the de-constructionists are using 
academic means – for example, lectures, papers, conferences – and not tactics 
of stigmatization, I see no grounds for complaint. Bracketing the possibility that 
some de-constructionists are also guilty of the latter (I will return to that), let 
me return to group (1) and consider their potential to infringe on free speech. 
Three possibilities stand out.
The Infringement
(i) Curricular Occupation
If the diversity supporters occupy the curriculum (a) by instructors from 
diverse backgrounds, and/or (b) with a variety of views previously excluded, 
and/or (c) by explicitly de-constructionist themes, then fewer courses are left for 
the traditionalists to teach. Above, I characterized (c) briefl y as a turf war, where 
the de-constructionist might stigmatize the traditionalist, but need not. I note 
that (a) reveals another issue overlapping with the thought-police complaint, 
those of hiring policies, an issue, as mentioned before, too complicated to 
include in this essay. As for (b), if the traditionalists are serious about objecting 
to the very idea of intellectual diversity, or think that diversity is dragging 
academic standards down (e.g., Emberley, 1996, p. 230, 232), they will have 
to utilize policies and formal channels of appeal15 (backed by facts, of course). 
That is a diffi cult task, and more so in a university committed to “recognition 
of the diversity of the University community” (Institutional purpose, 1992, 
p. 5), situated in a multicultural city, in a multicultural nation; but any challenger 
has the backing of another commitment of the university, that to the “highest 
academic standards” (p. 4). (Indeed there are many aspects of “multiculturalism” 
or “diversity” that call for examination, but such examination would have to be 
constructive, not the opposite. My note 7 points to a relevant source.) Thus we 
can conclude that (b) is a source of diffi culties, but not of thought-policing.  
(ii) Language Enforcement 
One of the other complaints, the censoring-of-language accusation, 
might be no more than an attempt by the traditionalists to prevent erosion 
of the “traditional” language they are used to (or want to use). As language 
changes not only in academia, but also in other communication venues and 
the wider society, as, for example bold sexist, racist, heterosexist, colonialist 
terms are gradually replaced with more neutral terms, the traditionalists might 
feel pushed out, forced to use a language foreign to them in order to survive 
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academically – a language whose connotations with which they do not agree, 
a style of thinking and writing that fi ts them and their sense of humour like a 
straight-jacket. Let me also bracket this legitimate-sounding complaint for now; 
however, this picture could only constitute part of the story, for the accusation 
is one of active “thought policing” via stigmatization. 
(iii) Confl ict of Rights
As mentioned, it would appear that two kinds of rights are in constant 
tension. The original infringement would be by the expression rights of the 
traditionalists on the equality rights of individuals in minority groups (a group 
to which a reformist may or may not belong) with their discriminatory speech 
acts. Thus, feeling confi dent that they have the lawful (in principle) backing 
for the equality rights of “identifi able groups,” the reformists might counter-
infringe, behaving like law-enforcers by trying to limit the free expression rights 
of traditionalists. That sounds like a defi nite case of illegitimate “policing.”
I will return later to what I think is a better characterization of the above 
relationship, one that eliminates the notion of “policing.” That aside, all three 
analyses (loss of intellectual turf to new curricula, new language pushing out 
the old language, and clash of two different kinds of rights) have revealed 
possibilities for “thought policing,” the last one standing as the most severe. 
Conceived in less dramatic terms, as limiting the free speech rights of the 
traditionalists, is the activity justifi ed?
To answer the question, we could use Mill’s list of conditions under which 
limits could be applied to speech, formalized by Sumner (2005).16 The conditions 
are as follows: 
Harm principle: the expression in question must cause harm to others. 
Consequentialist principle: interference with the expression must yield a 
better balance of benefi ts over costs than non-interference. (p. 33)
I am not going to follow the actual process through. Mere naming of harms 
is not the same as an empirical investigation of them; furthermore, for an 
institution whose “primary obligation is to protect the free speech of all involved” 
(Freedom of speech, 1992), the totality of harms to justify restricting that right 
would have to be signifi cantly high. I am fairly confi dent in speculating that if 
evidence signifi cant enough is produced, the issue is likely to be one that falls 
under hate speech, an area outside the limits of this essay. Moreover, the list of 
opposing harms, some already hinted at above, will have to include the harms 
born from the university losing one of its essential qualities, that of being “the 
custodian of this most precious and vulnerable right” – that is, the harms to 
students, instructors, and Canadian citizens. As well, some expected benefi ts 
might be imaginary. Ehrenreich’s (1992) caution on multiculturalism that “there 
is a tendency to confuse verbal purifi cation with social change” (p. 335) hints 
at one likely disappointment. 
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In sum, I do not think that the activity of “thought-policing” in universities 
can be justifi ed – neither do I think it is worth the effort. But I have become 
convinced that part of the problem is lack of honesty by both (some) traditionalists 
and (some) reformists about their respective motives and the nature of the harms 
they perceive. The rest of this essay is devoted to articulating that conviction 
and briefl y returning to the issue of “competing” rights. 
Re-orienting the Disagreement
First, both parties might benefi t from looking at the precise character of the 
inhibited speech. There is a difference between an instructor alerting a colleague 
to the rudeness of his racial slur, and her shaming him into holding back his 
fi ndings that for example in group X, spouse-beating is at a higher level than 
any other group, or his view that allowing Sharia laws in Canada is incompatible 
with liberal principles. (Subject to the usual vagueness that accompanies 
language use) there is a recognizable difference between derogatory and critical 
phrases and views. If it is of the fi rst kind, the traditionalist might want to take 
into account that what is expected from him is not “correct” language for the 
sake of “ideology,” but ordinary respect demanded by another human being. If 
it is of the second kind, then the reformist has to remember that respect for the 
humanity of another person or group does not entail being uncritical and blind 
to their shortcomings, taking “intellectual charity to the extremes.” Furthermore, 
the reformist must acknowledge and abide by the university’s proviso that 
“values of mutual respect and civility, may, on occasion, be superseded by the 
need to protect lawful freedom of speech” (Freedom of speech, 1992).
One of the greatest diffi culties in commitment to the right of free expression 
is genuine acceptance of the other’s freedom of expression, especially when 
one’s “cherished beliefs” are challenged. But whether it is the upholders of the 
intellectually rich Western tradition that are unnerved by “unorthodox ideas, 
alternative modes of thinking and living, and radical prescriptions for social 
ills” (Freedom of speech, 1992), or it is the reformists that are appalled by 
attacks by the ever-present “tradition” on the very principles that have taken 
them so long to secure (and are still far from secure), they must tolerate (if 
toleration is what it takes) others’ rights to free expression. Disturbing opinions 
are an integral part of academic life.17 If it is true that diversity, in Emberley’s 
(1996) words – “genuine plurality” (p. 233) –  matters to the reformists, they 
should not “stop at ethnic diversity and gender balance, but also look at 
intellectual diversity and balance” (p. 234). (I would add that they also have to 
recognize dissenting views within their own ranks.) Note that this advice also 
implies that traditionalists must view themselves as part of the diversity, not 
a replacement for it. Moreover, if the traditionalists are as eager to banish de-
constructionist themes to the curiosity shop of the history of thought as much 
as the de-constructionists wish to banish theirs, then they must admit to some 
disingenuity in their own commitment to the right of free speech. 
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The nervousness of the reformists about the idea of letting the traditionalists 
raise their voices without limit is understandable.18 As Mill (1956) noticed, 
there is no guarantee that a bad idea will expire when faced with truth 
(p. 84). Fortunately, universities are the best we have as far as testing grounds 
for opinions and theories go, because they have standards, bogus-detectors if 
you will, that are more effective than those of other institutions.19 Those worried 
about an appalling idea burying a good one should send the bad idea to a 
university so it can have its 15 minutes of fame. But if unusual or unpleasant 
opinions are not allowed into or are immediately evicted from the university, 
they will go underground, as Mill has also pointed out (p. 40); the truth of that 
is evidenced today by Internet’s becoming the new sanctuary of fringe ideas. 
There the opinions will fl ourish independently of fact, rational analysis and 
values, and it will be too late for a recall.
If the reformists are worried about the vulnerability of their intellectual 
position in the face of centuries of tradition that is barely and infrequently 
out of sight,20 then coercive behaviour is the worst reaction. If they are trying 
to prevent the return of the systemic discrimination of some groups, perhaps 
including their own, then instead of silencing the discriminators, they may well 
be better advised to raise the volume of the other side. Sumner (2005) reminds 
U.S. that the positive features of a claim-right, the “periphery” of the core right, 
might include “enhancement, or development, or facilitation” of that right 
(p. 11). “The periphery,” writes Sumner, “can also include duties imposed on 
others (or on the state) to provide them” (p. 11). If that duty is taken seriously (and 
given that a university, in virtue of what it is, has the necessary infrastructure 
to enhance, develop and facilitate expression), the focus of the reformists can 
shift from protecting to promoting. Then we can, following the suggestion of 
Drakich et al. (1995), think of expression in a university as a “reciprocal right” 
(p. 127), instead of one in competition with another right. This is the “better 
characterization” I mentioned earlier of the relations between the two parties.21
Last and most diffi cult, I repeat that everyone in an academic environment 
is expected to be self-consciously resistant to the natural human propensity 
to fear change. If we stand fi rm by this recommendation, we might be able to 
live with our differences, and even welcome radical challenges to our cherished 
beliefs. Part of what makes U.S. human, after all, is our ability to modify our 
convictions. As for those of U.S. content with our convictions, we can “rejoice 
that there is someone to do for U.S. what we otherwise ought” (Mill, 1956, 
p. 55).
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NOTES
1 “Expression” is a wider term than “speech,” but in this essay the two are 
used interchangeably.
2 That said, complaints about restrictions on expression may also come from 
within those named groups, which, in my opinion, is a more serious accusation, 
but of a somewhat different nature. 
3 Here, “expression” is meant to include behaviour, but my focus will be 
mainly on speech.
4 I owe my use of rights terminology to Sumner’s (2005) “A theory of free 
expression?” in his The hateful and the obscene.
5 The phrase “identifi able group” comes from Criminal Code of Canada, 
319 (2) in reference to hate speech. It is similar to “visible minority”; except the 
group in question is not always a minority; for example, it could be women. I 
shall nonetheless sometimes use “minority” “or group” instead of “identifi able 
group.”
6 For a fuller account of the complaints see Emberley’s (1995) “The cultural 
left” in Zero tolerance; also Richer and Weir (1995, p. 8).
7 If they are to be examined in conjunction with the freedom of expression 
complaint, that has to be done, in my opinion, in a work of broader and deeper 
scope. The Introduction to Political correctness by Richer and Weir (1995) 
illuminate the basic connections between these diffi cult issues.
8 See “Reconciling competing rights” section of Prohibited discrimination 
(1994, p. 4).
9  I borrow the phrase “balancing act” from Sumner (2005, p. 52-87).
10 Feelings alone are not evidence that one is being harmed by another. 
However, it is likely that even the most reasonable person will suffer psychological 
harm when the group to which she or he belongs, or herself or himself in virtue 
in belonging to that group, is publicly singled out as defective in some respect. 
Still, as I indicate in part (iii) of the next section, in the university setting, some 
of these harms might have to be balanced against other benefi ts.
11 Stasiulis (1995) gives an excellent presentation of some of the complexities 
and signifi cant shortcomings within those groups I have hastily named 
“reformists” in her “Diversity, power and voice: The antinomies of progressive 
education.”
12 Although evident, I should remind the reader that characterizing a 
“minority” as a homogeneous group – here, a deliberate oversimplifi cation - is 
an error made all too often by those on both sides of the political-correctness 
tension.
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13  I here admit the inadequacy of the title ‘reformist’.  De-constructionists 
are not merely reformists. 
14 There is much to say on this, which necessitates the de-constructionist 
embracing a paradox in order to avoid another, all of which complicates a 
straightforward explication, and I admit, undermines it. My purpose here, 
however, is to make the intellectual dynamics of academia as simple as possible 
for clarity’s sake. Simplifi cation too has its price; however, it leaves its subject 
matter open to de-construction.
15 For example, the university’s Guidelines for divisional submissions (2003), 
and Policy for assessment and review of academic programs and units (2005).
16 This decision puts U.S. in the realm of consequentialism. I think this 
kind of framework is most appropriate for examining actual “thought policing” 
cases, but I will not argue for that here.
17 It should be clear by now that I view free expression in universities as a 
hyper-freedom regarding expression, without committing to the generalization 
of the principle outside academia. 
18 It is not good, however, that this nervousness was identifi ed (in reference 
to Canadian writers) as “paranoia” in 1994  by Canadian writer Timothy Findley 
(1994), by no means a traditionalist. 
19 Even those standards are kept under scrutiny, as, for instance, challenges 
from philosophers of science from the last century have demonstrated.
20 It is only a decade ago that an inquiry into “sexual terrorism” and 
“systemic racism” in the university of British Columbia’s Political Science 
department took place (McEwen, 1995, p. 21-22).
21 For practical recommendations, see also Bankier’s (2000) caution to 
academics to “practice what they preach” and suggestions for developing more 
solidarity among them. 
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